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The Elizabeth Bouvia Case:
Legalizing Euthanasia by Lethal Injection
Rev. Robert Barry, O.P., Ph.D.

Father Barry, Linacre's book review editor, is working in the
Program in Religious Studies in the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences
at the University of llIinois, Urbana-Champaign.

Elizabeth Bouvia is a 28-year-old quadriplegic who suffers from
cerebral palsy. In 1982, she petitioned a court to order Riverside Hospital
near Los Angeles to provide her with hygienic care and painkillers so that
she could starve herself to death, but this petition was rejected by the
court.'
Earlier this year, Mrs. Bouvia returned to court because she had a
nasogastric feeding tube inserted by physicians at High Desert Hospital in
Lancaster, California. 2 The hospital and her physicians did this because
her weight had fallen to 70 pounds or less, and they feared she was trying to
starve herself to death. Mrs. Bouvia, with assistance of attorneys of the
American Civil Liberties Union, petitioned to have this tube removed
because she felt that it was intrusive, unnecessary and burdensome.) She
claimed that she was not intending to starve herself to death , but that she
was trying to feed herself orally.4 This form of feeding, ' however, was
complicated by the fact that she was unable to retain orally administered
food on many occasions. s
High Desert Hospital resisted her petition and argued in court against
removing the feeding tube on the grounds that Mrs. Bouvia's real intention
was to kill herself by starvation, that her death would result from its
withdrawal , and that physicians had a duty to provide what was just
normal and minimal care.6 The California Second District Appellate
Court rejected the hospital's argument and ordered the feeding tube
removed. And it seems from the court's opinion that the hospital also was
prohibited from transferring her to another institution as long as she
wished to remain there, just because her treatment decisions were contrary
to hospital policy. 7
We should recall that it was this very same three-judge panel which
decided the Barber v. California case and brought about the cycle of
withdrawal of feeding cases.8 It now appears that this panel has laid the
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legal foundations for physicians to give patients lethal injections upon
request, for as we shall see, it held that hea lth care professio nals have a
duty to help suffering patients find a quick and painless death if the y desire
it. It also appears that this decision will bring us a cycle of cases dealing
with the provision of lethal injections upon request by health care
professionals to chronically ill, handicapped and terminally ill patients.
In what follows , I would like to review the court's opinion and then
comment on the case. In closing, suggestions for measures that could be
taken to prevent the legalization of mercy killing by omission of morally
required care and treatment or by positive action will be made .
I

The Holdings of the Court.
The court upheld Bouvia's right to refuse even life-sustaining feeding,
and it even required the hospital to provide a substantia l part of her care,
such as alleviating her pain and suffering. To den y her the treatments she
requested would violate her constitutional right to privacy, according to
this court:
Here Eli za beth Bou via's decision to forego medical treatment or life-support
throu gh a mechanical mean s belongs to her. It is not a medical decision for her
ph ys icia ns to make. Neither is it a lega l question whose soundness is t o be
reso lved by lawyers or judges. It is not a conditional right subject to a pprova l by
ethi cs co mmittees or co urts of law. It is a moral a nd philoso phical decis io n that ,
being a competen t adult, is hers a lone.

The court noted that Bouvia was unable to enter a private hospital
because she was without mean s, and the hospital could not deny her relief
from pain and suffering merely because she was refusing some treatments
they wished to provide:
We d o not doubt the sincerity of [the hos pita l a nd medical personnel's] mora l a nd
et hi ca l beli efs, or their sincere belief in the positi o n they have taken in thi s case.
However, if th e right of th e pati ent to se lf-d etermination as to his own medica l
treat ment is to ha ve an y mea ning at a ll , it must be paramount to the interests of
the pat ient's hospital and d octors ... The right of a competent adult to refu se
medica l trea tment is a constitutionally guaranteed right whi ch mu st not be
abridged . 1o

The appellate court grounded its order to remove the feeding tube on the
right to refuse medical treatments , and it construed this right very broadly:
The right to refuse medical treatment is basic a nd fundamental. It is recognized as
a part of the right of privacy protected by bot h the sta te and federa l constitutions
. . . Its exercise requires no one's a ppro va l. It is not merely one vote subj ect to
being overridden by medical o pinion. "

In holding that this right to refuse even food and water is elemental, the
court clearly meant that this right was not to be abridged, restricted or
limited in any way. The primary authorities cited for this viewpoint were
the cases of Barber v. Superior Court and Bartling v. Superior Court. 12
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The court argued that the right to refuse treatments was not to be
restricted , and even certain death res ulting from a refusal of treatment
should not be a ll owed to impede its exercise:
A ll dec isions per mitting cessation of medica l trea tme nt or li fe -su pport
procedures to so me degree hastened the arrival of dea th. In part , at least , thi s was
permitted beca use the quality of life during the time remaining in those cases
has bee n terribly diminished to th e po int of hopel ess ness, use less ness ,
unenjoya bilit y and frustration. She, as the patient , lying helpless ly in bed , unable
to care for herse lf, may consider her existence mea ningless.13

The court argued in this manner, even though a number of other courts
have differed with this judgment. In Brophy v. Massachusetts, for
example , Judge David Kopelman argued that a purported declaration of a
desire to refuse treatments should not be construed to mean that feeding
should be withheld. 14 And In the Matter a/Claire Conroy, the New Jersey
Supreme Court argued that feeding could only be removed from a
terminally ill incompetent patient, but not from the competent and
nonterminal. 15
The a ppellate court claimed that Bouvia had a right to live out her life
with dignity and peace. 16 It suggested that her decision not to accept tube
feeding was not a decision to commit suicide, but one to let nature take its
course. 17 It suggested that she had wanted to co mmit suicide, but she failed
to carry out that desire when she had the opportunity. Rather, it claimed
that Bouvia was merely resigning herself to an early death , and was not
trying to kill herself. 18 But this is highly doubtful , as her weight loss seemed
to be due more to her refusal to eat than to difficulties she has in retaining
foods. If this is true, then her rejection of the feeding tube would be
suicida l, just as any refusal of oral feeding by her wou ld be suicidal as well.
The court should have adopted a more protective course and held that
feeding had to be given because her true intentions were unclear.
The court gave consideration to the possibility that Bouvia had an
intention to commit suicide, but this motive was not to be permitted to
inhibit the exercise of her right to refuse medical treatments. 19 The court
simply dismissed assertions that the right to refuse medical treatments
should be limited to those who are termina lly ill:
Moreover, as the Barrling decision hold s, there is no practical or logical reaso n to
limit the exe rcise of this right to "terminal" patients. The right to refuse treatment
does not need the sanction or appro va l by a ny legi slative act, directing how and
when it sha ll be exercised .'o

The court pointed out that there was no foundation for such a restriction,
and it asserted that previous cases had placed no restrictions on the right of
a patient to refuse medical treatments.2 1 The appellate court cited
statements of the American Hospital Association , the Los Angeles County
Medical Society and the President's Commission, among other sources, to
justify its opinion , even though some sources such as the Commission did
not explicitly consider whether the refusal of treatments could be
permitted if suicide were to be a result of a treatment refusal. 22
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The court did mention the recently announced opinion of the Judicial
Council which held that feeding could only be removed from a comatose
patient, and not from a competent patient like Bouvia. It also cited the
opinion of the Judicial Council of the American Medical Association
which declared that the physician was to sustain life and relieve suffering. 23
When neither of these are possible, then the choice of the family or legal
representative of the incompetent person was to prevail. What this means
in practice is that authorization from one of these to bring death by act or
omission should be respected, as the physician is obviously not able to
sustain life or relieve pain in those circumstances.
In a rather casual manner, the court rejected numerous arguments put
forth by the hospital for providing Bouvia with assisted feeding. 24 The
court rejected the view that there were limits to the right to refuse medical
treatment because:
.. [a] competent adult pati ent has th e lega l right to refuse medical treatment ..
The patient's interests and desires are the key ingred ients of the decision making
process. 25

It rejected the argument that Bouvia had been admitted to a public facility
and was therefore involving the state in her suicidal action which
prohibited the hospital from cooperating in the suicidal act of rejecting
life-sustaining medically providable food and fluids. 26 It rejected the view
that she was not comatose or terminal and was truly trying to starve herself
to death . It rejected the argument that she was asking for medical
treatment which prohibited her from picking and choosing those
treatments she wanted.27
The court also rejected arguments that there were state interests in
preserving life, preventing suicide, protecting innocent third parties, and
maintaining the ethical standards of the medical profession that could
limit her right to refuse medical treatments. 28 To justify rejecting these
claims, it relied on the Bartling and Barber cases, hich was a rather
superficial way of dealing with the serious problems involved in this case.
The court acknowledged that Elizabeth Bouvia could live for 15 or 20
years if feeding was continued . 29 But it discounted the importance of this
probability by arguing that the length of time a patient was expected to live
was irrelevant to the right to refuse care such as the nasogastric feeding
tube:
It is incongruous, if not monstrous , for medical practitioners to assert their right
to preserve a life that someone else must live, or more accurately, endure, for " 15
to 20 years." We cannot conceive it to be the policy of this State to inflict such an
ordeal upon anyone 30

The court agreed that the withdrawal of medical treatments usually
hastened death, but it argued that the poor quality of Bouvia's life justified
her decision to reject the feeding tube:
In Elizabeth Bouvia's view, the qua lity of her life has been diminished to the point
of hopelessness, uselessness , unenjoyabiIity and frustration .. . Does it matter if it
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be 15 to 20 years, 15 to 20 months , or 15 to 20 days if such a life has been physically
destroyed and its quality, dignity and purpose gone?"

It explicitly admitted that her decision to refuse the feeding tube was made
out of a motive to bring death , but it denied that such a motive could be
used to limit the right to refuse treatments.
The appellate panel decided that it was not necessary to define or dwell
at length on what constituted suicide. It noted that aiding suicide was a
crime, but it asserted that all cases of assisted suicide involved positive
actions taken by individuals and these were different from the exercising of
a constitutional right to refuse a form of care or treatment. 32 By pointing
this out, the court seemed to be asserting that the withdrawing offood and
fluids simply could not be considered as assisted suicide ul1der the law
because it was a medical decision and not a positive act of killing. It noted
that this was the teaching of the Barber and Bartling courts, as if these were
the final authorities.
In many places, the appellate panel's decision appeared to be little more
than pro-euthanasia propaganda. Judge Lynn Compton wrote a separate
concurring opinion which was an outright endorsement of mercy killing
and assisted suicide:
Eli zabeth apparently has made a conscious and informed choice that she prefers
death to continued existence in her he lpless and , to her, intolerable condition. I
believe she has an absol ute right to effectuate that decision. The state and the
medical profession instead of frustrating her desire, should be attempting to
relieve her suffering by permitting and in fact assisting her to die with ease and
dignity. The fact that she is forced to suffer the ordeal of self-sta rvation to achieve
her objective is in itself inhumane.
The right to die is an integral part of our right to control our own destinies so long
as the rights of others are not affected. That right should , in my opinion, include
the ability to enl ist ass istance from ot hers , including the medical profession in
making death as painless and quick as possible.
That ability shou ld not be hampered by the state's threat to ' impose lega l
sanctions on those who might be disposed to lend assistance .
The medical profession , freed of the threat of governmental or legal reprisal,
would, I am sure, have no difficulty in accommodating an individual in
Elizabeth's situation."

He concluded his opinion with the assertion that "[I]fthere is ever a time
when we ought to be able to get the 'government off our backs' it is when
we face death - either by choice or otherwise."34
II

Analysis of the Court's Holdings

There are distressing elements in this decision . First, the Bouvia decision
has apparently denied the hospital and staff the right to be free from
participation in the suicides of patients admitted to facilities where they
serve. In this respect, the Bouvia court has gone far beyond what even the
courts would permit in abortion cases, for the U.S. Supreme Court did not
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require that individuals participate in abortions against their consciences.
If the Bouvia decision is allowed to stand, it would mean that health care
professionals in public institutions could be released from their positions
for refusing to participate in what they understand to be suicides. The
ultimate implication of this decision is that public hospitals may, in fact,
become state supported euthanasia centers.
Second, the court seemed to believe that there was no duty incumbent
upon the state to take reasonable measures to prevent what appeared to be
suicide. The court here explicitly granted Bouvia the right to commit
suicide by refusing to be fed. This court has apparently renounced any
obligations to prevent the seriously ill, handicapped or terminally ill from
committing suicide. The appellate panel narrowly focused on the right to
refuse medical treatments, and it did not give any consideration to the duty
of health care professionals to take reasonable measures to prevent what
they consider to be suicidal actions. The court has also ignored much of
living will legislation which has excluded nutrition and fluids from the
class of electable medical treatments.
Third, it is clear that the court has endorsed the "pure content less patient
autonomy" model of the physician-patient relationship. This model holds
that the physician is to abide by patient wishes irrespective of their
content. 35 This model is very detrimental to health care professionals
because it forces them to violate what they perceive to be their professional
obligations and duties. This decision-making model is an overreaction to
the "Golden Age" of medicine where the patient had few rights to reject a
decision made about his or her care by the physician. Rather than
endorsing this pure contentless patient autonomy model, the court should
have endorsed the covenant model of the patient-physician relationship
which would stress the mutual duties of health care professionals and
patients in making medical decisions. 36
Rev . John R. Connery, S.J., has emphasized the notion that the issue at
stake in these cases is the quality of treatment given to me'dically dependent
and vulnerable persons and not the quality of their lives Y What he meant
by this was that courts have a jurisprudential obligation to promote the
highest quality care for medically dependent persons and that this
consideration should dominate concerns for quality of life or privacy. The
Bouvia court stressed the notion that medical decision-making was to be
guided by the patient's wishes and desires , rather than by the canons of
medical ethics or of high quality medical care. Rather than encouraging
them to do that, according to Connery's views, legal decisions in these
cases should have been concerned with mandating the highest quality care
and treatment for one such as Bouvia.
Conclusion
The Bouvia decision will prove to be a landmark decision, drawing us
closer to fully legalized mercy killing. Judge Compton's concurring
opinion has established the legal foundation for lethal injections, and
18
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virtually any state court in the land could invoke his opinion to support a
decision to give a lethal injection to a disabled person.
This decision will have a profound impact on medically vulnerable and
handicapped persons , for it will encourage them to follow Bouvia's
example and order all care and treatment removed or withheld when they
grow tired of their condition and suffering. Within the health care
professions, it has undermined opposition to mercy killing by ordering
public hospitals to participate against its stated policies in what it perceives
to be a suicide.
This decision makes it clear that the strongest proponents of mercy
killing will not tolerate the imposition of any limitations on those who wish
to end their lives. They do not believe that assisted suicide should be denied
anyone, and they clearly hold that it should be provided for those who are
not terminally ill, but who consider their lives too painful and burdensome
to continue.
To counter this movement and to prevent the legalization of suicide and
mercy killing, it is necessary to remove life-sustaining medically providable
nutrition and fluids from the legal class of medical treatments that can be
declined by patients. If suicide by omission of life-sustaining medically
providable food and water is to be legally prevented, it will be necessary to
legally define these as aspects of normal, routine customary care and basic
patient maintenance. 38 It is necessary to do this in order to preserve the
right of patients to decline extraordinary and radically burdensome
treatments, but to also require them to consent to care and treatments
whose provision prevents their committing suicide.
It would also be wise to enact legislation at the state and federal levels
which would require the provision of medically providable food and fluids
to patients who are not able to take these orally except when their
provision would hasten or cause death. This would prohibit refusal offood
and water in situations where their rejection would be equivalent to
suicide. Finally, it appears that it will soon be necessa ~y to strengthen
assisted suicide laws so that it would be considered a felony not only to aid,
assist and abet suicide, but also to procure any instrument or potion for
another person, knowing that it would be used for suicidal purposes.39
With the emergence of the euthanasia movement at this time, we have
seen our society come full circle from abortion. With legal endorsement of
abortion, it became legal to perform directly lethal omissions or
commissions against human life as it was entering the fullness of being.
Now, with the rise of the euthanasia movement, many are contending that
it should be legal to perform directly lethal omissions or commissions
against life in its twilight. With the legalization of abortion, millions were
killed simply because they were unborn . But with the dawn of euthanasia,
we must fear that just as many will die because they are infirm,
handicapped , terminally ill or too costly.

August, 1986

19

REFERENCS
I. Bouvia v. County of Riverside, Riverside County Superior Court, # 159780, 1983.
2. Bouvia v. Superior Court (1986) Cal.App.2d slip opinion. at 7.
3. Id. at la .
4. Id. at 23 .
5. Id. at 7.
6. Id.
7. Id. The majority opinion of the court stated:
Petitioner is without means to go to a private hospital , and apparently, real parties'
hospital as a public facility was required to accept her. Having done so it may not deny
her relief from pain or suffering merel y because she has chosen to exerc ise her
fundamental right to protest what little privacy remains to her. at 26.
8. Barber v. Superior Court (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1006.
9. Bouvia v. Superior Court, supra. CaI.App.2d . at 20.
10. Id. at 17.
II. Id. at 8-9 . " It follows that such a patient has the right to refuse any medical
treatment, even that which may save or prolong life." Id. at 8.
12. Barber v. Superior Court, supra. 163 CaI.App.3d. 186, Bartling v Superior Court,
( 1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 186.
13. Bou via v. Superior Court, supra. Ca I. App .2d. at 19-20. One must wonder how this
young woman can consider her existence meaningless when her case has put virtually an
entire nation on edge!
14. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, The Tria l Court, The Probate and Family Court
Department, Norfolk Division , #85E0009-G I. Patricia E. Brophy, Guardian of Paul E.
Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital. In c. Judgment at 4-5.
15. In the Maller of Claire C. Conroy, 190 N.J. Super. 453 , 458-60 , 464 A.2d 303 , 305-6
(N.J. Super. A.D. 1983) at 313-4.
16. Bouvia v. Superior Court, supra. Ca I.App .2d. at 22. The majority opi ni on held:
Being competent she has the right to live out the remainder of her natural life in dignity
and peace. It is precisely the aim and purpose of the many decisions upholding the
withdrawal of life-support systems to accord and provide as large a measure of dignity,
respect and comfort as possible to every patient for the remainder of his days, whatever
be their number.
17. Id.
18. This judgment was disputed by Judge Lynn Compton in his concurring opinion :
I have no doubt that Elizabeth Bouvia wants to die ; and if she had the full use of even one
hand , could probably find a way to end her life - in a word - commit suicide. In order
to seek the assistance which she needs in endi ng her life by the only means she sees
available - starvation - she had to stultify her position before this court by disavowing
her desire to end her life in such a fashion and proclaiming that she will eat all that she can
physically tolerate. Even the majority opinion here must necessarily "dance" around the
issue. Bouvia v. Superior Court, supra. CaI.App.2d, concurri ng opinion, Judge Lyn n
Compton, at 2.
19. The court held that:
Moreover, the trial court seriously erred by basing its decision on the "motives" behind
Elizabeth Bouvia's decision to exercise her rights. If a right exists, it matters not what
"motivates" its exercise. We find nothing in the law to suggest the right to refuse medical
treatment may be exercised only if the patient's motives meet someone else's approval. It
certainly is not illegal or immoral to prefer a natural, albeit sooner, death than a drugged
life attached to a mechanical device. Bouvia v. Superior Court, supra. Ca l. App. 2d. at 24.
20. Id. at 13-4.

20

Linacre Quarterly

21. The court, however, apparently referred only to the Californ ia cases of Bartling and
Barber, but did not mention the land mark Quinlan or Conroy cases which restricted
withdrawal of respiratory or nutritional and hydrational assistance to those who were
terminall y ill. The Conroy decision explicitly limited removal of care and treatment to
those who were terminally ill, and it was open to criticism by some for that judgment.
22. lei. at 14-17.
23 . lei. at 16-7.
24. lei. at 19-25. The court never did explicitly address the issues of protecting innocent
third parties or protecting the professional medical ethics, and it argued that the motive of
desiring to commit suicide was not relevant to one's freedom to exercise the right to refuse
medical treatment.
25. lei. at 9-1 O. These were quoted from Barber v. Superior COUrl, supra. CaI.App.2d. at
1019-1020.
26 . Bo uvia v. Superior COUrl , supra. CaI.App.2d. at 25-6.
27 . Id.
28. Id. at 19-25 .
29 . lei. at 19. What the court failed to mention was that Elizabeth was med ically stable
and that denying her food and fluids would be to introduce a new and independent lethal
cause. Ordinarily, both the law and morality consider this to be killing, but the court did not
give any consideration to this .
30. lei. at 20, 22.
31. lei. at 19-20.
32. Id. at 24-25.
33 . lei. at 2-3 , Concurring opinion of Judge Lynn Compton.
34. Id. at 4.
35. The pure contentless pa tient model is a "quick fix" to a deeper problem of growing
mistrust between health care professionals, patients and our nation's courts. This mistrust
was generated in large part by the rise of the abortion movement over the past 20 years
where many physicians abandoned life-saving for life-taking. It made many physicians into
life-destroyers rather than healers, and this profoundly shook the prestige of hea lth care
providers. Patients who had almost a blind confidence in physicians that they would always
and everywhere preserve and promote life , came to distrust many of them , believing they
had abandoned their classical professional ideals. But since then , American physicians
became the only class of private citizens in our nation to have the legal power to destroy
innocent unborn human life by their own authority . This virtually un limited power
spawned a great deal of mistrust among patients, who retaliated with threats and act ions to
make physicians pay for their negligence and malpractice as a way of ge'tting them to refrain
from destroying life.
37. See Connery, S.J., John, "In the Matter of Claire Conroy", Linacre Quarterly , Vol.
52, No.4, November, 1985, pp. 324-5.
38. It is necessary for this categorization because the law has the power to proh ibit
competent and rational individuals from electing certain medical treatments for their own
benefit. It is because of this that the law can prohibit competent and rational decisionmakers from taking laetrile which is an unproven medical treatment. The best way of
protecting competent persons from committing suicide by rejecting life-sustaining and
medically providable food and water is by placing these in the category of normal care
along with other forms of patient maintenance as hygienic care, protection from exposure,
psychological support and exercise.

August, 1986

21

